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th event focused the world’s attention on the threat of bioterrorism to 
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  1The Bioterrorism Act of the USA and international food trade: 




Increasing global trade and decreasing tariffs brought sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
trade issues to the forefront of the discussion. Several countries overhauled and 
streamlined their food safety legislation in order to ensure a safe supply of food products 
and to prevent the introduction of invasive alien species potentially harming domestic 
livestock or crop production (e.g. New Zealand
1, European Union
2). In general, these 
legislative steps focused on the prevention of unintentional pests’ introduction or food 
adulteration; however, since the events of September, 11
th, the threat of intentional food, 
crop or livestock manipulation is at the centre of interest. 
These intentional manipulations are captured under the term bioterrorism and are 
defined as “the threat or use of biological agents [to cause harm] by individuals or groups 
motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives” (Meyerson 
and Reaser 2002, p.593 following Carus 2001, p.3). The World Health Organisation 
(WHO), defining food terrorism as “an act or threat of deliberate contamination of food 
for human consumption with chemical, biological or radionuclear agents for the purpose 
of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social, economic or 
political stability”, (WHO 2002, p.8) focus on the specific problem of food terrorism and 
even expand the definition of terrorism by including chemical and radionuclear agents 
into the picture. However, both definitions have in common that the wilful harm of 
humans or assets is the distinction between (bio-) terrorism and accidental outbreak of 
crop or livestock diseases or foodborne illnesses. Some authors also are talking about 
                                                 
1 Biosecurity Strategy adopted in 2003. See http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/bio-strategy/index.htm 
2 General Food Law adopted in 2002. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/foodlaw/index_en.htm 
  2agroterrorism and relate to the specific risks, agricultural production and the food chain 
are exposed to. A definition for agroterrorism is provided by the National Defense 
Research Institute as “deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock 
or into the food chain, for purposes of undermining socioeconomic stability and/ or 
generating fear” (Chalk 2004, p. xi). Others differentiate terrorism by the underlying 
motivation for the attack. For example Carus distinguishes terrorist, criminal and state 
activities by motivation and objective. Terrorist activities are defined as activities of 
certain groups/individuals having an ideological objective, where criminal activities are 
undertaken without ideological objectives but may be based on pathology or individual 
motivation like revenge, and states’ activities characterise the use of biological agents as 
weapons e.g. within wars (Carus 2001, footnote 7). Given the framework that is provided 
by the Bioterrorism Act (BTA), we use a slightly modified WHO definition, i.e. 
focussing on food terrorism resulting from biological agents only.  
According to Meyerson and Reaser, bioterrorism differs from other form of 
terrorism in three different way (Meyerson and Reaser 2002): First, the mass destruction 
of life (humans, animals, or plants) is a major goal besides the intimidation of 
governments or societies; depending on the incubation period and visibility of symptoms, 
second, the attack may not be readily apparent until the biological agent has spread 
significantly among populations or species; and third, it may be impossible to establish 
whether the release of the organisms was intentional. In recent years, bioterrorism has 
received much more emphasis relative to chemical and nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction since nuclear weapons require extensive infrastructure to produce and 
chemical weapons require greater quantities of material to produce mass casualties. 
Furthermore, they are not self-replicating after an attack. Biological weapons, however, 
are relatively easy to manufacture and bioterrorism infrastructure can be hidden within 
legitimate health infrastructure. They are much more difficult to detect and an attack may 
not be immediately apparent. (Kuliasha 2003) 
Given this, the food chain must be evaluated as an especially vulnerable part of 
the American industry since many different actors are involved in production, processing, 
storage, distribution, and retail and a biological attack might not be readily apparent and 
easily vertically spread over all participant actors. Agriculture and related sectors 
  3contribute with up to 13% to domestic GDP (GAO 2003), and a threat might cause 
significant economic disruption in addition to the general effects for social and political 
stability (Schaub 2002). Further economic impacts of bioterrorism attacks relate to (based 
on Schaub 2002, Monke 2005, Chalk 2004): 
−  Direct losses of crops, livestock, and other assets 
−  Secondary losses in upstream and downstream markets 
−  Indirect effects address the international level as well, e.g. a loss of export 
markets, price effects, reduction of economic growth caused from a reallocation 
of resources. 
Given that nearly 20% of all imports into the U.S. are food and food product imports 
(FDA 2003) governments are challenged to find the right balance between border 
security and trade openness. As a response to September 11
th, the U.S. is implementing 
several security measures to ensure the safety of U.S. ports and the food chain. In 2002, 
the Homeland Security Bill created the Department for Homeland Security (DHS), which 
among other responsibilities unified all agencies and personnel responsible for border 
protection and import inspection under one administrative body. Besides the development 
of a National Strategy for Homeland Security
3, several new legislative acts shall help to 
reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism. One of these measures is the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (“The Bioterrorism 
Act”, BTA) of 2002, entering into force December 12, 2003.
4  
After the notification of this act as a sanitary and phytosanitary measures to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU) and several other countries 
have raised concerns about the widespread trade impacts and costs of this regulation for 
imports (WTO 2003). The trading partners wanted to ensure that the requirements 
applied to imports from foreign countries are based on a risk assessment and not more 
burdensome than similar domestic requirements. Even though there was no follow up on 
                                                 
3 This strategy defines three key priorities for the U.S. and six critical mission areas for action (e.g. border 
and transportation security, protection of critical infrastructure, or the emergency preparedness and 
response). The food and agricultural sector is part of the critical infrastructure therefore deserving special 
attention in the prevention of terrorist attacks. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/ 
4 Further legislation responding to this are the Container Security Initiative and the 24-hour Advanced 
Vessel Manifest Rule.  
  4the trade concerns in the WTO framework, smoothness of trade does not seems to be 
satisfying, as the BTA is still a point on the agenda of meetings and organization (e.g. EU 
Commission 2005). 
1.2 Methodological  context 
Administrative import regulations like those covered by the U.S. Bioterrorism Act belong 
to the group of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) covering all measures that are not tariffs such 
as quantitative restrictions, technical regulations regarding product and process standards, 
labeling and packing requirements, and administrative imports requirements which may 
include different instruments (e.g. licensing, certification, border inspections). Such 
administrative import requirements may hinder trade because of the following reasons 
(National Board of Trade 2002): Data and documentation requirements, lack of 
transparency on requirements, lack of audit-based controls and risk-assessment 
techniques to justify certain barriers, high degree of unpredictability and lack of 
automatisation of procedures or lack of co-operation between agencies. 
At the political level, the group of administrative import rules has been 
increasingly discussed by aiming at positive benefits from a reduction or harmonization 
of such barriers. The objective of trade facilitation was added to the WTO agenda as one 
of the Singapore Issues in 1996 and specific negotiations were commenced in 2004 by 
integrating it in the Doha Work Programme declared at the General Council of 1 August 
2004 (WTO 2004). The WTO defines trade facilitation as “simplification and 
harmonization of international trade procedures” (WTO website), where trade procedures 
are the “activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, 
communicating and processing data required for the movement of goods in international 
trade” (OECD 2002, p.6). 
Studies on the methodological analysis of NTBs or the effects of trade facilitation 
have increased in the recent past, however, empirical quantitative measurement of NTBs’ 
is still facing difficulties. Due to the heterogeneity of such measures comprehensive 
studies on general methods are limited (OECD 2003a), and most often they are focusing 
on certain sectors or selected types of NTB groups (OECD 2003a).  
  5In particular, when it relates to quantifying the impact of import regimes studies 
are very rare or use data that is rather old. However, there are some recent examples such 
as Doran (1999) assessing the costs due to import administration for the service sector, 
and Wilson et al. (2003) who first defined trade facilitation by differentiating indicators 
like port efficiency and second, quantified the impact of indicators on trade flows 
regarding the Asian Pacific region. A comprehensive OECD study of 2002 (OECD 2002) 
summarizes the results of existing studies on quantifying the costs of trade regimes. A 
range of assessed costs of 2% to 15% of the trade transaction value is identified 
depending on different covered cost components and different methodological 
approaches (OECD 2002, p. 12).  
Among the approaches used for quantification of NTBs (OECD 2003a, p. 43ff.) is 
the price-wedge method to provide a tariff-equivalent calculated by determining the 
difference between the domestic price (when a NTB is in place) compared to a reference 
price without NTB. As the latter is unobservable, this calculation most often compares 
the domestic and the foreign price (e.g. on world market or F.O.B. price at the port of 
entry) of a comparable good. Other methods for identification and quantification use 
econometric frameworks as e.g. the class of gravity models where bilateral trade flows 
are regressed on a set of internal and foreign prices and explanatory variables that are 
associated with the trade barrier (Anderson and Wincoop 2004). Supplementary work 
uses expert surveys or inventory methods to identify relevant NTBs and evaluate their 
level of protection. 
1.3  Objective of the paper 
This paper is focussing on a certain type of NTBs: Import regulations in the area of food 
safety. As an example for this type of NTB, we use the newly introduced Bioterrorism 
Act of the U.S. to show how food safety concerns and administrative import requirements 
interplay and therefore impact bilateral trade. Given this, this paper has the following 
objectives: 
1.  The analysis is based on a qualitative inventory approach identifying the provisions 
addressed by the BTA and comparing them with existing international measures. 
Some studies exist that use a comparative inventory evaluation (Henson et al. 2000) 
  6or that add further econometric evaluation (Moenius 1999, Otsuki et al. 2001). An 
accurate systematization of these measures will be undertaken according to the 
relevant WTO-framework since the inventory approach will be used subsequently to 
evaluate the measures regarding conformity with the WTO principles of the SPS-
Agreement.  
2.  Finally, bilateral trade data for food imports will be reviewed in order to analyse if 
empirical evidence for the trade impact of the legislation can be found. The approach 
is based on a trade flow analysis as performed in OECD (2003a). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, an overview on the existing 
provisions of the BTA is given. Afterwards, the BTA provisions will be evaluated 
according to the WTO principles of the SPS Agreement. Subsequently, the trade flow 
analysis will be used to provide some empirical evidence on trade impact for selected 
products and countries beforehand identified as most strongly affected by the BTA 
provisions. Finally, further issues for research are identified and conclusions are drawn. 
2  Import rules under the Bioterrorism Act 
Objective of the Act 
The objective of the Bioterrorism Act is “to improve the ability of the United States to 
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies” 
by providing additional information and action tools to the administration.
5  
Relevant provisions 
The BTA is divided into five titles of which Title III explicitly relates to food safety 
under the heading “Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply”. The other 
relevant title referred to in this analysis is Title II “Enhancing Controls on Dangerous 
Biological Agents and Toxins” aiming at the control of domestic laboratories using 
certain agents and toxins. 
                                                 
5 The act in full can be found on the following web page: http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/. Additionally, 
the FDA maintains a separate web side with all relevant information on the BTA legislation and 
implementation (http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/bioact.html).  
  7Title III of the BTA is applied to all food products determined for the U.S. market 
regardless of if the product is processed within or outside U.S. territory. It contains four 
important provisions
6:  
1.  Administrative detention of food
7 when “credible evidence or information 
indicating that such article presents a threat of serious adverse health consequences or 
death to humans or animals” (Section 303) is given. Furthermore, Section 304 allows the 
authorities to debar persons or firms from imports into the U.S. when they repeatedly 
violate the import regulations set out in this act. 
2.  Registration of food facilities and determination of an agent (Section 305): This 
provision requires domestic and foreign facilities that manufacture/process, pack, or hold 
food for human or animal consumption in the U.S. to register with the FDA. Domestic 
facilities must register whether or not their food enters interstate commerce and foreign 
facilities and must additionally designate a U.S. agent who must live or maintain a 
business place in the U.S. and is physically present in the U.S. Excluded from registration 
are private residences of individuals with food manufacturing or storage capacities, 
farms, restaurants, retail food establishments, non profit food establishments, and fishing 
vessels. Additionally all facilities regulated exclusively by the United States Departments 
of Agriculture (USDA) are excluded.  
3.  Establishment and maintenance of records (Section 306). All domestic firms that 
manufacture, process, pack, distribute, receive, hold, or import food must establish and 
maintain a record keeping system. This measure applies to all foreign persons that 
transport food into the U.S. or place food directly in contact with its finished container. 
Exclusions apply again to the group of facilities as listed above. Source and recipient of 
all food items must be recorded including address, type of food, brand, variety, type of 
                                                 
6 Final or interim rules of these measures are published in the Federal Register (FR). These publications 
contain additional information on background of the proposed legislation, summary of comments received 
on earlier version of the rules, economic impact analysis, and some administrative issues. For the measures 
discussed in this paper, the following version of the legislation are used: Administrative Detention: Final 
Rule published June 4, 2004, FR 69; Registration of Food Facilities: Interim Final Rule published October 
10, 2003, FR 68; Prior Notice of Imported Food: Interim Final Rule: Interim Final Rule published October 
10, 2003, FR 68; Establishment and Maintenance of Records: Final Rule December 9, 2004, FR 69. 
7 The term food in this regulation generally refers to the definition as provided by Section 201(f) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. It includes all food and beverages for human and animal 
consumption including chewing gum and all items used for components of any such article.  
  8packaging, and receive and delivery date. Records must be kept for 6 month to two years, 
depending on the nature of the food item, and must be accessible within 24 hours.  
4.  Prior notice of food shipments (Section 307). All food items that are imported into 
the U.S. must be notified within a time frame, depending on the mode of transportation, 
of maximum 5 days and minimum 2-8 hours prior to arrival with information containing 
article specification, the manufacturer and shipper, the grower (if known within the 
specified time in which notice is required), the country of origin, the country from which 
the article is shipped, and the anticipated port of entry. An inadequate notice leads to 
import refusal or detention. Excluded from this requirement are items for personal use 
and gifts, products under USDA jurisdiction, and food that was made by an individual in 
the personal residence and enters the U.S. for non-business reasons.  
Responsible agencies 
The food safety and inspection system for agricultural commodities in the U.S. is 
complex and based on the interaction of several agencies (GAO 2005). The BTA 
provides the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the responsibility for carrying 
out the provisions related to the security of the food and drug supply (Title III). However, 
cooperation with other agencies is necessary: The USDA has the oversight over agents 
and toxins deemed to be a threat to animal or plant health as laid out in Title II as well as 
authority
8 for the safety of the products meat, poultry, and processed eggs. The DHS has 
the responsibility for inspection of all animal and food imported into the U.S. conducted 
by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel. For the imports of live animals 
and not edible plant and plant products, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), another branch agency of the USDA, has oversight. Furthermore, APHIS is 
responsible for the issuing of Import Permits for animal, fruit and vegetable food 
products.  
Changes in the import regulations 
In order to provide an overview on changes in the import regimes introduced by the BTA, 
Table 1 summarizes the most important import requirements that were in place prior to 
                                                 
8 Conducted mainly by the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), a branch agency of the USDA. 
  9the BTA. The basic reference for product and admissibility standards is the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) that is enforced by the FDA.
9 
Prior to the BTA, the general import procedure for food consisted of the 
following steps: Filing of entry information with the U.S. Customs authorities by the 
importer, entry notification from the Customs authorities to the FDA, a decision process 
within FDA if an examination of the entry is necessary, and if this should took place, then 
the owner or consignee should hold the shipment and no further distribution was allowed 
until a final decision was made (FDA 1999). Hence, a major difference compared to the 
BTA relates to the notification time frame for entry of food shipments. According to the 
former system, the FDA received the information up to several days after arrival, 
implying that the food may have already been delivered to the ultimate consignee (FR 68, 
Vol. 197, p. 58976).  
However, there are a number of product categories where more detailed import 
requirements were specified and further administrative steps for food imports were prior 
to the BTA being enforced. Depending on the category, these requirements consist of a 
registration of the food facility and specific product information with arrival at the port 
(low-acid canned products), obtaining of import permits prior to shipment (alcoholic 
beverages, fruit and vegetables, dairy products), or having a food safety control system in 
the production facility in place (seafood, live fish). The import permits were issued for 
the complete firm and kept valid for up to five years (e.g. fruits and vegetables).  
Therefore, for some products the provisions of the BTA do not alter very much 
from already existing procedures (e.g. canned products), whereas for most other products 
(e.g. alcoholic beverages, fruit and vegetables, seafood, other food items), larger changes 
were required and relate to the above described information requirements with respect to 
products and facility as well as the timeliness within the import process.
10  
                                                 
9 The FD&C Act can be found under http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title21/chapter9_.html. 
Note that there exist numerous other laws regulating issues related to production and marketing of food 
products (e.g. Public Health Service Act, Fair Packaging and Label Act, Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act, Food Quality Protection Act). Further information can be found in FAS (1999). 
10 Note that the requirements related to obtain import permits or inspection certificates are still in place.  
  10Table 1 Summary on important import requirements for specific food categories 
prior to the BTA 
Product group  Basic legislation  Provisions in addition to the “general import 
procedure” prior to BTA 
Meat, poultry and 
eggs 
Federal Meat Inspection Act 
Poultry Products Inspection Act 
Egg Products Inspection Act 
Equivalence of food safety system  
Inspection and approval of foreign facility  
Firm-related import permit 
Inspection at port-of-entry 




Low-Acid Canned Food program 
Registration of food facility 




Federal Alcohol Administration Act 
Firm-related import permit 
Fresh fruit and 
vegetable 
FD&C Act  Inspection certificate 
Firm-related import permit 
Dairy products  FD&C Act 
Federal Import Milk Act 
Firm-related import permit 
Quota system 
Seafood and live 
fish 
FD&C Act 
Procedures for the Safe and 
Sanitary Processing and Importing 
of Fish and Fishery Products 
HACCP system must be in place and verified by 
foreign government inspection authority 
or  
Equivalence or compliance agreement with the 
U.S. 
All other food 
items 
FD&C Act   - 
Note: For alcoholic beverages, the Bureau of Alcoholic, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is responsible for 
administering the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. Herein, further import requirements (e.g. with 
respect to the label) are laid down. 
Source: Own compilation based on information from FDA, APHIS, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
The group of other products face the most drastic changes due to the BTA 
implementation as formerly no special requirements in addition to the general import 
procedures were in force. Depending on the ability of firms to adapt these new 
components in the import protocols, this may lead to product and country specific trade 
impacts as they will be analyzed in chapter 4. 
  113  WTO conformity assessment 
In this chapter it will be analyzed whether the BTA provisions are in line with relevant 
WTO rules. WTO disputes on NTBs gain increasing relevance
11 and a regime evaluation 
in light of WTO compliance may not only avoid extensive dispute activities but may also 
contribute to improve the design of such measures.    
However, rules for trade facilitation are covered by different WTO agreements 
rendering a conformity assessment difficult. Only a few explicit WTO agreements on 
import procedures exist, such as the “Agreement on Preshipment Inspection” or the 
“Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures”. Other explicitly security motivated rules 
are addressed by the GATT Article XXI implying “that no country shall be prevent from 
taking action to its essential security interests”.  
Since the BTA has been notified to the WTO under the SPS Agreement
12, our 
analysis focuses on the food safety-specific trade provisions as covered by this 
agreement.  
3.1  The food-specific framework for the conformity assessment: The SPS 
Agreement  
The objective of the SPS agreement is twofold and combines both, granting a national 
protection level to be defined sovereign by the members and minimizing resulting trade 
effects (Josling et al 2004, p. 4). Since the adopting of the SPS Agreement in 1994, the 
articles of this agreement provide the relevant framework for trade-related food safety 
rules in the context of international trade.  
The SPS rules selected for the following conformity assessment can be interpreted 
as core provisions since most of the food safety related disputes referred to them (Rudloff 
2005). The first set of rules described under (1) is targeting at the national protection 
                                                 
11 Out of 328 cases initiated after 1995 more than 60 refer to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and the SPS Agreement which are the relevant agreements for NTBs in the food sector (Rudloff 
2005). 
12 See G/SPS/N/USA/690 (Prior notice), G/SPS/N/USA/691 (Registration of food facilities), 
G/SPS/N/USA/703 (Establishment and Maintenance of Records), and G/SPS/N/USA/704 (Administrative 
Detention). Note, that the measure “Registration of food facilities” is also notified under the TBT 
agreement (G/TBT/N/USA/32). Available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
  12level that is chosen by a country whereas the second set (2) is linked to the specific 
measure used to enforce the protection level at the border: 
(1) Appropriate level of protection. Under the SPS agreement each member has the right 
to implement measures seen as appropriate to achieve human and animal and plant 
safety by ensuring that measures are only applied to the extent necessary (Art. 2, par. 
2). The appropriate level of protection should be based on risk assessment 
considering the levels of probability and damage in terms of loss of production or 
sales (Art. 5). 
• Standards of international organisations are recommended as they are deemed to be 
scientific necessary (Article 3). The relevant international organisations are the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) for food safety standards, the International 
Office for Animal Health in the context of animal health standards (OIE) and the 
International Plant Protection Convention for plant health standards (IPPC) (Annex 
A). 
• If higher safety levels compared to international standards should be achieved a 
scientific justification has to be provided (Art. 3, par. 3). 
(2) Once a level of protection is accepted according to the above mentioned rules this 
protection level is allowed to be enforced at the border to avert imports potentially 
undermining the protection level. However, the SPS Agreement also provides 
guidance on the choice and design of an implemented trade measure: 
• Enforcing measures should be non-discriminating and national treatment should be 
ensured (Art. 2, par. 3). These are core rules that hold not only for food trade and 
are covered by the GATT (GATT Art. I and III). They target at both equal 
treatment of imports coming from different members and of imported and 
domestically produced goods. 
• Additionally equivalence (Art. 4) is recommended. Hereby, SPS measures of the 
exporting countries should be accepted as being equivalent if achieving the same 
protection level. The exporting country has to proof that its varying measure is able 
to achieve the protection level of the importing country. Members shall establish 
bilateral agreements to recognize the equivalence.  
  13• Regionalization is an important rule for animal and plant diseases as part of food 
safety (Annex A, par. 6). According to this concept pest and disease free regions 
(areas) are defined for specific diseases and out of such regions exports should be 
accepted. An area is defined not on a country basis but can either be a region 
within one country or can gather regions across several countries. This offers the 
possibility to export from one region even if another region in the same country 
may not be risk-free. Like for equivalence the burden of proof to demonstrate the 
risk free status lies with the exporting country. 
• The most often used argument related to the chosen measure in WTO food disputes 
(Rudloff 2005) is that the measure at stake should be the least- trade distorting 
one. A measure is seen as not more trade-restrictive as required unless there is 
another measure that is less trade-restrictive but achieves the same level of 
protection (Article 5, par. 6 and footnote 3). Additionally the technical and 
economic feasibility is considered when evaluating a trade measures (Article 5, par. 
6). 
3.2  Evaluation of BTA provisions  
3.2.1  The appropriate level of protection – The problem of assessing bioterrorist 
risks 
The scientific necessity for accepting a domestic protection level that can be required 
from importers is the starting point of the SPS-Agreement. In all concluded WTO 
disputes on food safety, this argument was the major basis for the final findings of the 
dispute bodies (Rudloff 2005).  
Risk assessment describes the process of defining the probability of adverse 
effects (Hood et al. 2001, p. 3). On the international level and with respect to food safety 
risks, the CAC defines a four step procedure for assessing food risks : (1) identifying 
hazards, (2) characterizing hazards with regard to adverse effect e.g. by dose-response 
assessments, (3) analyzing exposure assessment by describing likely intake of identified 
hazards and agents, and (4) risk characterization by a qualitative or quantitative 
  14assessment of the probability of occurrence and the severity of the known or possible 
adverse effect (CAC 2003c, p 183). 
Probability assessment  
Bioterrorist risk may be characterised as “new” risks where the probabilities are unknown 
and therefore they face the situation of uncertainty. Probabilities can hardly be based on 
frequencies as empirical information on past events is weak.
13 Besides this general 
problem of few reported events the existing literature lacks comprehension and accuracy 
regarding the type of attacks (deliberate or incidental; terrorist, criminal or state 
motivated; bio- or food terrorism) (Tucker 1999 p. 1, Carus 2001 p. 3).
14  
Covering all types of activities (terrorist, criminal, state), Carus (2001) derives an 
increasing trend of biological attacks. In particular in the last decade, the number of 
reported cases increased
15 though the minority of them was caused by terrorist 
motivation. 
Table 2 Empirical frequency – conflicting coverage in different studies  
Period  Terrorist Criminal Other  Total 
1990-99  19  40 94 153 
1980-89  3  6 0 9 
1970-79  3  2 3 8 
1930-69  2  4 0 6 
1900-29  0  4 0 4 
total  27  56 97 180 
Source: Carus 2001, p. 11. 
To identify food terrorist cases that are according to our definition, i.e. caused by 
deliberating biological agents in the food chain, a review of existing studies was 
necessary (Chalk 2004, Carus 2001, Manning et a. 2005, Parker 2002, Tucker 1999, 
                                                 
13 Moffitt et al. 2005 provides an analysis of modelling concepts for bioterrorism in the context of 
uncertainty.  
14 Carus is probably the most comprehensive and accurate source in terms of both number of analyzed 
cases and strict use of proper definitions (Carus 2001). 
15 A relevant influencing parameter could be the improved reporting over the time. 
  15WHO 2002, Wilson et al. 2000). As a result only three food terrorist attacks could be 
identified since 1900:  
1.  Rajneeshee case: In 1984 a fanatic religiously motivated group contaminated food in 
salad bars and restaurants in Oregon, U.S.A. in order to incapacitate voters to win 
local elections. About 10 restaurants had to be closed for a longer period and 751 
cases of illnesses are reported. 
2.  Anthrax case: In 1972 Anthrax was brought out in Rhodesia to cattle (Manning et al. 
2005).
16 
3.  Mau Mau case: In 1952 a plant toxin from the African Milk Bush was used to kill 
livestock by a rebellion group (Mau Mau) that was fighting again the British 
colonization (Manning et al. 2005).  
Neither for the Mau Mau nor the Anthrax case human health effects are reported. In 
addition to the accomplished cases, Carus (2001) lists all potential but never finally 
clarified cases as well all known threats. But out of this group no explicit case linked to 
food terrorism can be added.  
Damage assessment  
The evaluation of adverse effects is covered by the CAC guidelines for risk assessment as 
part of the final step to characterize risks. In general such adverse effects consist of direct 
economic effects on supply and demand, secondary losses for up- and downstream 
markets, indirect effects including trade losses, and all socio-psychological long-term 
effects reducing political and social stability: Just a minority of the few studies on 
bioterrorist attacks lists or evaluate the caused damage (see Table 3) and only for the 
Rajneeshee case as food terrorist case, information on illnesses in the population is 
available.  
A possible proxy for assessing the damages of food terrorist attacks can be the 
costs of food accidents
17, since in this area of incidental contamination more studies (see 
Table 3, last column). The case of the Enteriditis infection from contaminated ice cream 
                                                 
16 No further background on motivation and target of the attack could be found. This case is only referred to 
in Wilson et al. (2000).  
17 See for an overview on existing studies OECD (2003b). 
  16in 1994 in the U.S. causing 224000 cases of illness indicates the potential for huge 
damages on public health. However, only very few data on the monetary evaluation of 
damages is available. Nevertheless, these values can be rather significant, as for example 
the damage of the Listeria accident of 1998 in the U.S. was assessed with 50-70 Mio $, 
and the Eschericha coli accident of 1996 in the U.S. with 14 Mio $ (see Table 3). A very 
comprehensive study of Buzby et al. (1996) calculated costs per single pathogen for the 
U.S. per year and estimates 6.5 - 30 Mio $ and 9000 deaths each year. 
Table 3 Damage assessment of terrorist and incidental food contamination 
Food- terrorist 
contamination 








751 Chemically  contaminated 
cooking oil, 1981, Spain 
200 cases of illness 
and 800 deaths 
(2) Anthrax case  no information  Chemically contaminated 
watermelon, 1985 USA 
1 272 cases of illness 
(3) Mau Mau case   no information   Typhimurium infection by 
pasteurized milk, 1985 
USA 
170 000 cases of 
illness 
Enteriditis infection from 
ice cream, 1994 USA 
224 000 cases of 
illness 
Escherichia coli infection 
from radish sprouts,  
1996 in Japan 
8000 cases of illness 
including deaths 
Escherichia coli infection 
of apple juice, 
1996 USA  
70 cases, 1 death 
14 Mio $ 
 
Listeria infected meat, 
1998 USA 
35 cases of illness 
50-70 Mio $ 
  All microbioliogical 
pathogens in food per 
year, U.S. (Buzby et al. 
1996) 
9 000 deaths 
6,5 – 30 Mio $  
Source: Incidental cases in WHO 2005 and Manning et al 2005. Other cases from Carus 2001. 
Conclusion  
Because of the mentioned difficulties, the basis for assessing the bioterrorist risk of an 
individual country is limited. Therefore conclusions for the U.S. specific food terrorist 
risks cannot be drawn easily. However, in the area of agroterrorism risk Parker (2005) 
and Chalk (2004) identified a potentially high risk level for the U.S. They base their 
result on U.S. specific production patterns that tend to increase damages and 
  17probabilities: Large size or complexity of agribusiness networks, high degree of 
monocultures, huge (spatial) production concentration, high degree of vertical 
integration, large scope of unregistered illicit employment especially in the service area 
(restaurants and bars), and intensive husbandry systems
18. As institutional factors that 
increase the U.S. vulnerability, Parker (2005) and Chalk (2004) identified an ineffective 
surveillance and reporting system and a lack of knowledge about foreign animal diseases. 
Food terrorism may depend on different parameters than agroterrorism since other 
actors are involved (e.g. processing and retail systems). However, it is to assume that a 
similar risk could be identified for the U.S. food chain.
19 Given the above highlighted 
limited data availability, the protection level achieved by the implementation of the BTA 
cannot be evaluated. Here, further research is necessary. 
3.2.2  Harmonization and scientific risk assessment  
In this section it will be evaluated whether the BTA provisions are following the SPS 
criteria for harmonization by recommending international standards or justifying stricter 
standards by a scientific risk assessment. Given that different types of international 
standards exist for dangerous substances and for import regimes, the analysis will be 
separate for these areas: First, the covered hazardous agents of the BTA are compared 
with international standards, and second the outlay of the measures that are used to 
achieve the U.S. protection level will be analyzed with respect to international provisions. 
3.2.2.1 Harmonization  as  regards addressed hazards 
The identification of hazards is the starting point for the CAC risk assessment process. 
However, the bioterrorist relevant hazards are not specifically addressed in Title III of the 
                                                 
18 The modern husbandry system can increase the vulnerability of livestock to diseases due to the high 
densities.  
19 The risk assessment undertaken from official site came to a similar finding for food terrorism. They 
conclude “that there is a high likelihood, over the course of a year that a significant number of people will 
be affected by an act of food terrorism” (FDA 2003b, p. 8). Note that the official risk assessment related to 
the BTA legislation is not publicly available. Only a brief qualitative summary is accessible.  
  18BTA and only the very general statement on relevant hazards in the form of “bioterrorist 
threats to the food supply” is provided (Section 301a).
20  
BTA provisions 
The application area of the BTA is not restricted to certain potentially hazardous 
substances as the BTA addresses without any substance-related differentiation all FDA 
products similarly (table 1). Nevertheless, the BTA regulates the possessing and transfer 
of listed agents and toxins under another title: Title II on “Enhancing Controls on 
Dangerous Biological Agents and Toxins” rules the authorization of laboratories dealing 
with these substances. The listed agents serve as indicators for what the U.S. in general 
defines as crucial hazards even though not explicitly related to food. 
The agents referred to by the BTA are defined by different U.S. agencies: APHIS 
lists 52 agents as potentially bioterrorist dangerous.
21 The USDA identifies 43 livestock 
pathogens and toxins  dangerous for animals and plants and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) identify 37 bioterrorism agents especially with impact for 
human health.
22 Comparing all domestic lists overlaps can be identified (Monke 2005), 
but the relevant focus in this analysis lies on a comparison of the domestic lists with 
existing international standards.   
The analysis will focus on agents and toxins with impact on public health. 
Therefore all addressed animal diseases are zoonotics
23 and the list of the USDA that is 
restricted to animal and plant health is excluded. 
                                                 
20 Additionally, a further challenge for this analysis lies in the fact that - at least to our knowledge - the 
BTA is the first trade related legislation written with explicit reference to the prevention of bioterrorism 
attacks. Furthermore, no WTO dispute case ever has been brought up in the international dispute settlement 
framework that could provide guidance on the definition and evaluation of protection measures against 
these sorts of incidents. 
21 Title 7 CFR, Part 331, Title 9 CFR, Part 121 and Title 42, Parts 72 and 73, March 18, 2005. Available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/programs/ag_selectagent/ag_bioterr_toxinslist.html at 17 July 2005. 
22 CDC standards are available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp, at 17 July 2005.  
23 Diseases that may spread from animals to humans.  
  19International standards 
With respect to the international standards, it is important to distinguish that the type of 
coverage can be different for the CAC and for OIE, the two relevant standard setting 
bodies: 
•  One traditional area of Codex’ standards are product standards that are for instance 
addressed by maximum residua levels for substances. These standards though are not 
expressed for any of the bioterrorist agents. More relevant are processing standards 
for which the Codex developed a several ones. Examples are “General principles of 
meat hygiene (CAC 2003a) relating to influence on staphylococcus, or “Guidelines 
for canned products” (CAC 1985) influencing the contamination with Botulinum 
neurotoxin. 
•  The OIE standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (“The Code”) defines 
health measures to be used by the veterinary authorities of importing and exporting 
countries (OIE 2004a).
24 Relevant for the following analysis are the standards of the 




The following table summarizes the comparison of agents relevant for public health 
addressed in the BTA and by international organizations. The comparison only refers to 
the general coverage i.e. whether hazards are tackled in any manner by not looking at 
different instruments to address them.  
With respect to the BTA references, for six agents the APHIS list is more 
comprehensive than the CDC list (marked in grey). On the other hand four agents are not 
covered by APHIS although listed by the CDC, among which the Salmonellosis can be 
mentioned.  
                                                 
24 The other catalogue of standards is the “Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 
Animals” (“The Manual”). This is covering detailed diagnostic procedures for the help of any veterinary 
(or parasitologic) diagnostic laboratory (OIE 2004b). Both categories of standards exist specifically for 
“aquatic” animals. 
25 Diseases to be notified fulfill criteria of international relevance – i.e. they should have the potential for 
international spread and for human infections or causing other relevant diseases. 
  20Table 4 Comparative coverage of food terrorist agents with public health impact  
BTA reference          International Organizations 
APHIS  CDC  OIE  CAC 
Antrax    X  X   
Botulinum neurotoxins   X    X 
Botulinum n. producing species of 
Clostridium  
X   X 
Brucella abortus   X  X  X 
Brucella melitensis   X  X  X 
Brucella suis   X  X  X 
Burkholderia malle   X  X   
Burkholderia pseudomallei   X  X   
Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin   X    X 
Coccidioides immitis   - X   
Coxiella burnetii   X  X   
Eastern equine encephalitis virus  X  X   
Francisella tularensis   X   X   
Hendra virus  - X   
Nipah virus   - X   
Rift Valley fever virus   - X   
Shigatoxin X    X 
Staphylococcal enterotoxins   -   X 
T-2 toxin   -   X 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus   X  X   
Source: Own compilation based on information from APHIS, CDC, CAC, OIE and Monke 2005. 
The comparison of the BTA agents with internationally covered agents shows that all 
zoonotics are tackled by both frameworks and therefore the BTA cannot be seen as 
stricter (Monke 2005). According to Article 3 of the SPS Agreement no risk assessment 
would be necessary to justify a stricter or more comprehensive coverage of identified 
hazards with impact on public health.
 26 
                                                 
26 When extending the analysis to agents that are only dangerous to animal and plant health, the BTA is 
stricter than the OIE in three cases: Akabane, Camel pox, and Menangle (Monke 2005). The likelihood of a 
possible human infection with Menangle is currently discussed in the scientific community (OIE 2004c). If 
that would be proved the BTA would be stricter as well for agents dangerous for human health. 
  213.2.2.2  Harmonization as regards enforcing measures at the border 
Manifold instruments can be used to achieve a domestic protection level. The instruments 
of the BTA can be classified as process standards and as administrative import rules 
(Josling et al. 2004, p.18). Respective international standards are covered by different 
agreements but we still focus on food specific measures as ruled under the SPS-
Agreement and the recommended organisations.  
BTA provisions 
The BTA measures can be summarized according to their general objectives as (1) 
informative requirements targeted by registration and agent definition, prior notice and 
record keeping and as (2) controlling measures implemented by the provisions on 
detention. As regards the information objective the BTA requires highly individualized 
information, i.e. at the single companies’ level. As regards the control imports may be 
detent due to a failure in fulfilling the BTA provisions. 
International standards 
For theses categories international counterparts exist. These counterparts are not 
necessarily reflecting precise standards for import controls (e.g. frequency of controls) 
but rather more often just broad frameworks and principles to be considered are 
developed on the international level (CAC 2003b). This flexible character of the import 
rules makes it difficult to evaluate whether international standards are fulfilled. 
Evaluation 
The major difference between the BTA and international standards concern the first 
category, the information addressee and the required information criteria: Whereas the 
international organisations demand regionalized information the BTA’s addressee is the 
individual company. International guidelines require risk-specific and regional 
information as specified for example for anthrax in the OIE “Code”, Article 2.2.1.2 (OIE 
2004a) or on certification schemes (CAC 2000). Here, specific requirements to be 
covered by a certificate are defined in detail for each single disease. The type of 
information required by the BTA differs in this respect as no disease-specific but 
traceability-related information is requested. This identified difference between 
  22information requirements of the BTA and existing international guidelines does not allow 
drawing the conclusion that the BTA is stricter than the SPS Agreement requires.  
Information about process standards is more individualized and flexible than 
product standards: With regard to the risk status, the burden of proof lies with the 
exporter to demonstrate the risk free status (Brückner 2004, p. 10). Therefore, the option 
for additional measures to control the validity of the process standards is granted. Often 
import permits are based on additional evaluation of on the spot conditions, on a 
comprehensive assessment of regulatory programmes and quarantine procedures leading 
in the end to individualized information similar to those of the BTA.  
Related to controlling measures the BTA defines only the provision of detention 
if there is credible evidence whereas the OIE defines risk-oriented minimal duration 
periods for quarantine (OIE Code, Appendix 3.51) or rules for the diagnostic procedures 
to be undertaken at the border (OIE Code, Appendix 2.10.1.4.). It is important to state 
that neither the Codex provides specific standards for import control systems in terms of 
frequency (CAC 2003b, CAC 1995) nor does the BTA specify its sampling procedure 
and frequency. In this regard no deviation of the BTA from international standard can be 
seen. 
The identified distinctions between the BTA and international guidelines are by 
nature linked to the different purpose: The BTA addresses explicitly bioterrorism 
incidents whereas the international organisations aim at food safety and least-hindered 
trade. Given the flexibility of the respective international standards, the BTA cannot be 
evaluated as being stricter.  
3.2.3  Specific design of the enforcement measures 
3.2.3.1 Non-discrimination and national treatment 
Formally all BTA provisions are applicable to all importers leading to non-
discrimination. However, there may be some factual different effects because of 
individual trade patterns: If some trade partners had certain bilateral arrangements 
facilitating trade prior to the adoption of the BTA, their situation has become 
comparatively worse in relation to other countries (see on empirical evidence chapter 4). 
  23Similar findings might hold with respect to product categories and size of import 
quantities leading to different individual country effects. However, as these effects are 
usual adjustments of trade patterns due to changed legislation, the provisions of the BTA 
cannot be interpreted as discriminatory. 
Formally,  national treatment is ensured as well as the BTA provisions are 
applicable to both, domestic and foreign producers. But because some provisions are not 
relevant for domestic producer their economic burden may be lower:  
•  Designation of a U.S. agent is not relevant for U.S. firms. Since there is already 
established a professional market offering the agent’s services to foreign companies
27, 
this provision must be seen as problematic in the international framework as it certainly 
leads to a compliance cost difference between domestic and foreign producers. The 
specific burden for foreign companies is depending on the transactions costs and fees 
for finding and maintaining such agents.  
•  Prior notice of imports is not relevant for domestic producers. Hence, they are not 
facing delays in border processing as importers do. An evaluation of related costs 
identify significant relative burden for foreign companies (see “Analysis of Economic 
Impacts” as provided in FR 68, Vol. 197, p. 59023f).  
•  Differences may also refer to the frequency of controls either at the border or critical 
points in the domestic supply chain. Further empirical research would be necessary to 
elaborate on this issue. 
3.2.3.2 Equivalence 
While international standard setting aims at harmonizing the individual food safety 
levels, equivalence targets at the harmonization of specific measures to achieve the 
protection level. The SPS Agreement encourages explicitly bilateral consultations on 
equivalence and refers to international guidelines for conformity assessment. In principal, 
this provision recognizes that regulatory flexibility allows countries to allocate resources 
efficiently rather than identical (Josling et al. 2004, p. 48).The burden of proof for 
                                                 
27 One examples for such services is the company U.S. Food Agents, requiring around 600 $ for providing 
an agent for a facility per year. See http://www.usafoodagents.com/pricing.html#BPP, July 2005. 
  24demonstrating equivalence lies with the exporter. Hereby, the scope for unhindered trade 
based on equivalence is restricted since the failure of proof may allow for additional 
import requirements. The most relevant provisions in existing equivalence agreements 
refer to process standards rather than to product standards. Compliance with existing 
international product standards is more easily to be determined at the border as they can 
be checked directly by means of product characteristics. Therefore, Equivalence 
Agreements on product standards would not add any value. Process standards as search 
or trust characteristics (Caswell 1991) are more difficult to be controlled at the border and 
rely on the overall food safety system in the partner’s countries (OECD 1994). In this 
category most OIE and IPPC standards are located, and hence offering potential for trade 
facilitation by equivalence acceptance. However, only very few equivalence agreements 
exist as administrative transaction costs for negotiating and accepting equivalent 
measures are seen to be very high.
28  
The resulting difficulties with actually adopting equivalence agreements was a 
topic of a WTO SPS committee meeting and addressed steps that are necessary for 
fulfilling the equivalence process (WTO 2003, p. 12 and Brückner 2004, p. 98ff.). Some 
guidelines to support the process of negotiation and design of an Equivalence Agreement 
exist (CAC 1999) Besides the Veterinary Agreement with the EU, additional equivalence 
acceptance exists only for selected meat or dairy products with selected partner countries 
(APHIS 2004): In 2002, the U.S. granted altogether for 1080 establishments for meat and 
poultry imports equivalence. Most of the covered countries, except Japan, belonged either 
to NAFTA (92.5% of all granted equivalence) or European countries (7%) (George 
2003). With other trading partners, as for example Chile, free trade agreements might 
exist that address SPS measures and target at an enhancement of cooperation and 
implementation of SPS related issues (see Chile-US Free Trade Agreement, par.6)
29. 
The provisions of the BTA clearly overrule existing provisions within the bilateral 
agreements as far as FDA products are concerned. Meat and poultry products of the U.S.-
EU Veterinarian Agreement are not addressed by the BTA and therefore, agreed import 
                                                 
28 The Veterinarian Agreement between the U.S. and the EU, signed in 1999, took six years of negotiations 
(Josling et al. 2004, p. 49). This agreement defines equivalence for selected animal products. 
29 See http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
  25protocols should be still valid.
30 For other products, as for example live fish and seafood, 
the BTA provisions are applicable. For such countries, beforehand benefiting from easier 
import procedures, a relative disadvantage under the new regime can be expected and 
will be analyzed subsequently empirically.  
3.2.3.3 Least-trade  distortion 
The measurement of least-trade distortion according to Art.5.6. of the SPS Agreement 
requires a comparative analysis of alternative import regimes that achieve the appropriate 
level protection. Because of the described constraints in evaluating the appropriate level 
of protection, the following evaluation will not cover such a comparative analysis of 
alternative trade measures. Hence, a first simplification in the analysis is that only the 
BTA provisions will be analyzed and no other alternative measures. A second 
simplification relates to the fact that trade distortion will be assessed by the trade impact 
as proxy. This is possible since we assume that less trade impact goes along with 
measures that tend more towards being less trade distorting. Hence, for provisions that 
are found to be without prejudice to trade, we assume that they are less (or not more) 
trade distorting than any other potential alternative. However, the question if they are the 
least-trade distorting way of implementation is not possible to another with this 
procedure. A third simplification is related to the other requirement of Art. 5.6: The 
technical and economic feasibility of the measure. In some cases this might lead to a 
result where an import ban is the only answer to a health, sanitary, or phytosanitary risk 
since all other measures of protection would be either too costly to implement or not 
provide the same level of protection.
31 As we are not comparing different alternatives for 
the U.S. to enforce their protection level comparative conclusions on economic and 
technical feasibility cannot be drawn.  
                                                 
30 However, further information for a final evaluation is necessary. Due to the short time since the BTA 
inception and the shared objective to improve the security of the food supply, further bilateral 
communication between partner countries is necessary in order to clarify the new scope of existing 
agreements. For example the EU, as well as Canada, are engaged in bilateral discussion with the U.S. about 
trade and security issues. See for Canada http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/liaison/secur 
/20030325fse.shtml; for the EU: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/summit.htm. 
31 For example, this was the case in the appellate body decisions in the two hormone cases (WTO 1998). 
  26Cost impact and trade effect of BTA provisions 
In Table 5, an overview of the cost and trade impact of the food-related BTA provisions 
can be found.  
Table 5 Cost and trade impact of BTA provisions 
Measure  Cost impact on firms  Probable trade impact of measure 
Registration  
(US Agent) 
Increases costs  
Increase of administrative burden 
FDA estimate: 16% of foreign firms 
will cease imports, esp. firms with only 
few shipments 
Contribution of U.S. agent 
questionable: no legal liability, only 
communication point, emergency 
contact can be a non U.S. phone 
number 
Development of “Agent industry” 
Record keeping Might be covered in firms by existing 
record keeping systems 
Increase of administrative burden  
Might increase quality assurance and 
logistics 
Quick response in cases of 
emergencies might help to 
keep/restore consumer confidence 
Prior notice  Mostly within normal import procedure 
(ABI/ACS) 
Importers working formerly under 
expedited arrival procedure have 
disadvantages (BRASS) 
Problem for firms without internet 
access/computer equipment 
Slow down of food entry into the U.S. 
(perishable products) 
Processing of data and inspection 
capacities questionable 
However: Inspections might be better 
targeted 
Detention  Firms have to bear costs of detention 
(disposal reduced sales prices)  
Increases uncertainty of trade  
(no definition of “credible evidence”)  
Source: Own compilation based on FDA information available in the Federal Register. 
Evaluation 
There are two measures from which potential trade impact can be expected. The 
requirement to send a prior notice for all food shipments has different impact depending 
on the import procedure prior to the implementation of the BTA. In particular Mexico 
and Canada, countries with formerly expedited import procedures (see FR 68, Vol. 197, 
p. 59028) have disadvantages with the new system since planning of shipments and entry 
  27into the U.S. makes a longer time horizon necessary
32. Furthermore, the prior notice can 
only be electronically submitted to the FDA, implying that firms without computer 
equipment and internet access either have to acquire this equipment or cease trade with 
the U.S. For some firms in development countries this might be a burdensome or 
impossible requirement, not only because of the occurring costs but also because 
information technology in those countries often suffers from unreliability and related 
problems. 
With respect to administrative feasibility of the measure, however, one must add 
that the FDA considered comments from trading partners suggesting to streamline their 
import information system and made the option available to give the prior notification 
within the Automated Broker Interface of the Automated Commercial System 
(ABI/ACS) that process all other import information. In the year 2004, about 77% of all 
prior notice where handled over the ABI/ACS (FDA 2005). 
A second potential and probably significant trade impact result from the 
requirements that all foreign firms must designate a U.S. agent that represents their 
company in the U.S. and is 24 hours a day available 7 days per week. Since this person 
only serves as a communication link between the FDA and the foreign company and no 
legal liability is related to the function, in theory this agent might be a private individual. 
In practice, the requirement to be available 24 hours a day all year long not easy to fulfil 
for private persons and most foreign firms are seeking some type of business partner, 
foreign chamber of commerce representative, or legal entity to execute that function. This 
results in costs that can differ considerably.
33 
34 Furthermore, it is very much questionable 
if this is the least-trade distorting way of implementing a “communication link” between 
the FDA and food producing/transporting firms, since these firms are allowed to give as 
an emergency contact a phone number which might be located outside the U.S. (FDA 
                                                 
32 However, some of these disadvantages are going to be offset by e.g. the introduction of the FAST 
initiative of U.S. customs that allows participating entities with a “low-risk” profile to benefit again from 
an expedited procedure. 
33 The company U.S. Food Agents requires e.g. around 600 $ p.a. whereas the German American Chamber 
of Commerce is providing this service for 140 Euro per year for member firms (see 
http://www.gaccny.com/index.php?id=71&L=1). 
34 Similar critics were raised by Kerr (2004). 
  282004, No. 14.10). Given that the FDA estimated in its economic impact analysis of the 
proposed rules that up to 16% of the firms or an equivalent of up to 2% of all line entries 
might affected by this regulation and cease trade with the U.S. (FR 68, Vol. 197, p. 
58943) it is difficult to see that this requirement is addressed in the least-trade distorting 
way. The FDA expected in particular the small firms with less than 10 yearly line entries 
(shipments) into the U.S. to be affected by this provision.  
The other two proposed measure, administrative detention and record keeping, 
however, should not impose too many new requirements on exporting firms, since record 
keeping of suppliers and recipients of products is a well established fact in many food 
branches
35. Here again however, countries with less developed food safety and 
traceability systems will have problems to comply. It is to assume that mainly developing 
countries will be affected by this provision. 
In the case of the provision of administrative detention, procedure and trade 
impact is not as clear as no further specification of the “credible evidence” is given and it 
is difficult for firms to evaluate if their shipment might be detained due to terrorism 
information about their firm or products that is not available to them. A further 
clarification of this procedure would certainly contribute to an easier assessment. 
4  Empirical evidence from trade flow data 
This chapter analyzes if empirical evidence in import data can be found that the 
implementation of the BTA had an impact on the trade flows directed towards the U.S.  
Methodological considerations 
Even though the BTA provisions apply to domestic producers as well, we only focus on 
import data in this chapter, since two out of the four provisions, prior notice and 
registration with the designation of a U.S. agent, target specifically at importers and have 
a potential deterrent effect on trade. The focus of the analysis will lie on commodities and 
                                                 
35 And also condition in food safety systems of other countries, as for example laid down in the food law of 
the EU.  
  29countries for that we associated in the previous conformity analysis with countries being 
potentially adversely affected by the BTA legislation. 
Following theoretical considerations as provided by Roberts et al. (1999) and 
Buzby (2003), and based on the evaluation of the provisions as done in section 3.2.3.3, 
we assume that the implementation of the BTA will lead to a cost increase in the supply 
of imported goods. Depending on the burden sharing of these costs, these are losses that 
either importers or exporters have to carry, thereby reducing their profits. Additionally, 
these costs could also be rolled over to consumer prices and lead to a decrease in demand 
of foreign products and a probable substitution of imported with domestically produced 
goods. These developments– if they take place – should be seen in the trade flow 
development over time. 
Our analysis follows an approach provided by OECD (2003a) where trade flows 
were analyzed to deduct if average import quantities change as a result of a policy 
change. In performing this analysis we work with the underlying hypothesis that all 
deviations from past import patterns can be attributed to this policy change. This 
assumptions neglect other exogenous factors such as exchange rate movements, or 
changes in the macroeconomic or regulatory environment, that might affect trade flows 
and could be captured when defining a more formal model for an import flow – policy 
relationship. However, since our approach is rather easy to perform, this analysis 
provides a good starting point for a more thoroughly analysis of trade impact and might 
hint on sectors that are of particular interest for a more scrutinized BTA analysis. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that we cannot distinguish in the following 
analysis among the trade impacts of single BTA provisions, but rather look on the 
regulatory impact as a whole. Though it was possible to associate with each of the single 
provision a possible cost and trade impact, in the analysis of the trade data this is no 
longer feasible, since all measures entered into force at the same time and no further cost 
differentiation for the exporters is available.  
Insights from trade flow data 
As an introduction, in Figure 1, the development of total food imports in Mio  $ in 
quarterly data over the time period 1990-2004 is presented. The food imports show a 
  30clear positive trend that prevail the development also in the last year. For illustrative 
purpose, we introduced as well the imports of seafood and fish. Here as well, we observe 
a positive trend, however, with a much seasonal variation. 
Figure 1 Total food imports into U.S. (HS2) 

















































































TOTAL FOOD IMPORTS FISH AND SEAFOOD
 
Note: Import lines are sorted according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. 
Source: World Trade Atlas 2005 
However, this data is presented on HS2 level, a very broad food category classification 
which does not allow showing any substitution processes within categories and may 
overshadow all developments that take place in small important lines within these 
categories. Therefore, in the following we will present data for only one food category, 
seafood, and on a much more disaggregated classification. We opted for the seafood 
category, as seafood is the second biggest single food import category and is provided by 
many different countries which allow us to analyse several of the hypotheses on 
compliance related trade issues we identified in section 3.2.3Error! Reference source 
not found.. Furthermore, seafood is one of the products where the provisions of the BTA 
with respect to prior notice and registration with U.S. agent take effect. 
The largest import lines within the seafood category for four important U.S. 
importing countries are presented in Figure 2. We opted for these four countries since 
they can offer a broad perspective on several issues: Canada and Mexico, neighbor 
countries and most important food importers into the U.S. formerly had easier market 
access, and Chile and CAFTA countries have close trade relations with the U.S. and both 
  31agreed on free trade agreements in the recent time. The importing lines in this category 
are chosen from all import lines on HS4 level and are sorted according to the import 
value in the 4
th quarter of 2003. For the Canada, Mexico, and the CAFTA country 
aggregate, these imports consists of products related to the category “crustaceans”, 
whereas for Chile these are all products in the category “fillet and other fish meat”. 
According to the previous figure on total food imports, here again, it is not visually 
possible to find any alteration of the import developments over time. For Chile we 
observe a small decrease in the 1
st quarter of 2004, however, imports in the following 
three quarters seem to pick up again with the trend. 
Figure 2 Imports of seafood: Country comparison for large import lines 


























































































CAFTA Largest import line Chile Largest import line Mexico Largest import line Canada Largest import line
 
Note: Import lines are sorted according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. 
Source: World Trade Atlas 2005 
Next, we are focusing on the smallest import lines of these countries in the seafood 
category (Figure 3) since we argued in the last chapter that smaller import lines may be 
affected by the additional cost burden introduced by the legislation. The smallest import 
line is the sum of all import lines that show an import value of less than 5 Mio $ in the 4
th 
quarter of 2004. For the CAFTA countries, this aggregate consists of 4 import lines 
(dried/salted fish, frozen fish not fillets, other seafood, live fish), for Chile this sum 
contains also four items (dried/salted fish, crustaceans, other seafood, live fish), Mexico’s 
aggregate is built on five import lines (dried/salted fish, frozen fish not fillets, other 
seafood, live fish, fillet and other fish meat), whereas for Canada this import aggregate 
  32consists only of one import line (live fish). Contrary to the previous figures, these import 
lines provide a different picture. Here, a clear decrease of imports is observable for the 
countries Canada and CAFTA after the BTA entered into force. This figure seems to 
indicate that there might actually be costs related to compliance with the implementation 
of the BTA that makes it prohibitive for some firms to keep up their trade relations with 
the U.S. 
Figure 3 Import of seafood: Country comparison for small import lines 














CAFTA Import lines<=5 Mio $ in 4/2003 Chile Import lines<=5 Mio $ in 4/2003
Mexico Import lines<=5 Mio $ in 4/2003 Canada Import lines<=5 Mio $ in 4/2003
 
Note: Import lines are sorted according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. 
Source: World Trade Atlas 2005 
In order to further scrutinize on the finding that the smaller import quantities might be 
adversely affected by the BTA, we chose one product from the HS4 food category 
“crustaceans” and did a similar aggregation, however, across all countries importing into 
the U.S. The chosen product is “shrimp and frozen prawn”, since it shows the largest 
import values within this category. The total number of importers over the depicted time 
period is 117. Hence, we aggregated the import values of the 30 largest and smallest 
importers to one import line, respectively. Again, the ranking of small and large 
importers were done according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. The result can 
be seen in Figure 4. Here, the effect, indicated in the last figure is even more pronounced: 
In the first quarter of 2004, we observe a strong reduction of import levels and even 
  33though imports go slightly up in the following period they do not again reach historical 
levels. We take this as a further indication that the BTA legislation has some or even 
significant impact on trade. Depending on the country perspective and the amount of 
imports affected it that might be the case that the impact is even stronger than to be called 
only least-trade distorting. It is worthwhile to note that under these countries that seize or 
strongly reduce trade with the U.S. are a number of developing countries (e.g. Senegal, 
Somalia, Gambia), but also some developed (e.g. New Zealand, Portugal). 
Figure 4 Shrimp imports: Comparison of countries with large and small imports 
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Note: Import lines are sorted according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. 
Source: World Trade Atlas 2005 
As a last point on the agenda, we wanted to focus on the import development of a country 
that is partner in a free trade agreement with the U.S. covering some food relevant 
provisions and hence benefited from some import facilitation.
36 Accordingly, inFigure 5, 
seafood imports for Chile are presented and the same import line aggregation as before is 
used. The overall picture from this figure is that at least on the first sight no clear changes 
in import patterns are observable. However, for all three import lines, a slight depression 
in the first quarter of 2004 is recognizable which might hint at an adjustment process that 
                                                 
36 See Chapter V of the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (See http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements 
/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html). 
  34took place in that time in order to comply with the new rules. This is further underpinned 
by the fact that this sort of depression is not evident for other years, but of course, a better 
analysis of the seasonal pattern would be necessary, to put this finding on safe ground. 
Figure 5 Imports of seafood from Chile 

























































Largest import line Import lines > 5 Mio $/qtr in 4/2003 Import lines<=5 Mio $ in 4/2003
 
Note: Import lines are sorted according to import values in the 4
th quarter of 2003. 
Source: World Trade Atlas 2005 
Similar examples as shown for seafood could be found on a disaggregated product level 
for selected alcoholic beverages, coffee and spices, as well as for selected countries. 
However, on the other side there are also food categories, as e.g. vegetables, where no 
effects could be found.  
Conclusion 
This preliminary trade flow analysis shows that potential trade impacts from the BTA 
implementation can be expected. However, it should be again underlines that in order to 
come to meaningful and more robust results, a statistical verification of these effects is 
necessary. A further drawback in the analysis is, that since the inception of the BTA only 
one year has passed and available observations are scarce. It is to assume that over times 
firms are able to adapt to the new standards and that imports will move back towards old 
import levels.  
  355  Putting the BTA in a broader perspective: Further issues for 
research  
Given that there is only very limited experience with food terrorism attacks and design of 
regulatory protection frameworks against these effects, this work provides an 
introduction for a framework of analysis. However, in the course of the work there were 
several areas where only preliminary assessment could be offered as either information 
was scarce or the methodological framework is not yet well elaborated. Hence, in the 
following we want to address these issues briefly and show potential for further work. 
In regard to the WTO conformity assessment it would be necessary to expand our 
food-related framework to all relevant WTO provisions. In particular, the specific rules 
on trade facilitation like the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection and the overall 
provision to protect national security under GATT-Article XXI could supplement the 
analysis. Additionally, the evaluation of national treatment would need further 
information on different impacts for domestic and foreign producers due to diverging 
requirements of the BTA (e.g. the requirement of determining a U.S. agent or potentially 
different testing frequencies). Here, empirical data of related costs like transaction costs 
caused by the search for an agent or the level of fees may be considered. 
The discussions on risk assessment showed that the identification and evaluation 
of the appropriate level of protection is difficult due to limitations in determining 
probabilities and damage. In order to use information from past food contamination 
events, a clear indication and separation of the analyzed cases in terms of the underlying 
terrorist definition and more specific information on the damages are necessary. The 
evaluation of existing approaches as applied in other areas such as nuclear power or the 
use of genetically modified organisms may contribute to this issue.  
Subsequently, a risk assessment analysis based on a cost-benefit analysis could be 
possible where the benefits correspond to the reduction of food terrorist damages. Related 
to the costs, implementation related compliance costs are a first component. Here, only a 
few empirical studies on the assessment of these costs on firm level exist, though they 
indicate the high importance of these costs. More analysis could provide interesting 
insights for the future design of legislations and might contribute to a better 
  36understanding of why certain product categories are affected differently than others. A 
second component on the cost side would be foregone trade gains due to less imports and 
herewith related effects on price or consumer choice. Such a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis would require a clear identification of single relevant parameters influencing 
costs and benefits and could serve to evaluate the welfare effects of different measures. 
Related to this, the provisions of the BTA could be furthermore analyzed in the more 
general context of efficient risk management strategies, i.e. a comparative cost analysis of 
different measures that are applied to achieve certain risk reduction levels. Again, this 
strongly depends on an appropriate risk assessment that allows specifying certain risk 
levels.
37  
Regarding the empirical analysis of trade flows, an extension of the analysis 
toward firm samples or more disaggregated product categories promises to be fruitful and 
could provide more insight on adaptation processes in the affected industries. Similarly, a 
more detailed analysis for country groups, for example related to their developing status, 
could hint on specific implementation problems faced by these groups. Additionally, the 
time span of imports under the new legislation is rather short. In this situation, it would 
be interesting to see, if the indicated trade effects persist over time and what adaptations 
take place. Lastly, all sectoral interdependencies leading to price and productions effects 
in up-and downstream markets both domestically and internationally have been 
neglected, but certainly provide an interesting field for analysis.  
6 Conclusion 
The analysis showed the general difficulties in evaluating trade effects both, qualitatively 
and quantitatively, for the increasingly relevant NTB group of administrative import 
measures. In particular, the link of the U.S. BTA administrative rules to the issue of 
bioterrorism makes the analysis difficult: Whereas the analyzed WTO rules are targeted 
                                                 
37 Related to this context is the question whether the provisions in existing food safety laws in most 
countries and for which the SPS Agreement provides the international rules, are sufficient with respect to 
terror prevention or whether some additional explicit terrorism provisions as implemented by regulations 
like the BTA are superior. The EU referred to these arguments in its submitted comments on the BTA 
stating that existing food rules like rapid alerts systems would be sufficient (EU Commission 2002 and 
2003). 
  37at food safety, the BTA is explicitly aimed at biosecurity in terms of reducing 
bioterrorism risks This emerging new area of bioterrorism risk is by nature linked to food 
trade without having a direct counterpart in the frame of the SPS Agreement. The 
analysis of the question regarding whether the BTA is stricter than existing SPS rules 
highlights the underlying issue of flexibility in the area of process standards which are the 
relevant standards in the area of administrative import provisions. This was shown for the 
example of information requirements where international guidelines grant scope for 
individual adjustments. This flexibility facilitates disease and risk appropriate reactions 
by the importing country, relevant in preventing the spread of diseases, but constrains the 
evaluation whether international standards are overruled.  
This general finding may be relevant for the future debate on trade facilitation. It 
is expected that the question will not only be raised with respect to the design of least-
trade distorting measures but also on how binding existing international standards should 
be defined. This is relevant a relevant point when trade facilitation should be realized by 
harmonization of existing legislation since this requires to set a standards “corridor“ 
around given international benchmarks.  
The results of the empirical trade flow analysis illustrate comparative burden 
differentiation between countries. These differences can be caused by adjustment and 
learning costs that may differ among countries
38: For countries facing an more open 
import environment prior to the legal amendment due to expedited import procedures, 
free trade agreements, or equivalence agreements, adjustments may be relatively higher 
than for countries used to strict rules. The same is true in relation to products for which 
stricter rules are in place under the BTA. Other results indicate the “fixed cost” character 
of administrative import rules as small import quantities are affected most. A special 
problem may appear for developing countries that are lacking technical or human 
resource capacities to comply with these administrative rules. Additionally, they often 
import only small lots which imply an over-proportional cost increase. Furthermore, they 
are often importers of those products for which major regulatory changes could be 
identified (e.g. selected seafood). 
                                                 
38 One may take these trade losses also to approximate learning costs.  
  38If part of the questions outlined in the last chapter could be answered in the future, 
contributions to a better understanding of the actual trade effects in the area of trade 
facilitation could be made. By identifying more efficient and administrative trade 
measures, transaction costs could be reduced and overall welfare increased.  
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